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BRIEF OF A PPEI J EES/CROSS-APPEIJ -AINT? I 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
over cases transferrefi In mi by fin 1 Itati Supieme ('nuil 1'lic I ii.ih Supreme ('nun irnnsleneil 
this case to the court of appeals on October 19, 2001. 
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D FOR REV IEW AINU M'AMJARDiSU* REVIEW 
The plaintiff^appellant/'cross-appcllee, Fiigenc 1; Donis lists fno issues I1 
appealing in his brief However, those issues are really variations of the same question: 
L Whetner (/a , > uil court correctly determined that Doms were not entitled to a refund of 
ink *vv • ttfer tlh t n t \ i ,/i .',/ MIM1-
Standard of Review: Doms states that this issue should be (tidgeel bv a suuidmu 
correctness with no deference given to the trial court Plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants, 
I1 ILii Anderson mid 1 "\III and Jeanne Scot! (lollectnclv Atklet nin' or l'laintilts), assert that 
this issue presents a mixed question of fact and la « * \ hich i indei x\ liicli some defei eiice 
should be given to the ?ria1 court's determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1 w 11 In remanding the case to the tri'al court, the court of appeals granted the trial court 
discretion in dr lnmining tin. lights nl'lhe parlies I In mill staled 
On remand, the trial court should determine what is necessary to restore 
the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the contract. . 
How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it can, is a 
matter which is within the discretion of the trial court under the 
facts as found to exist by the trier of fact. The trial court 
therefore has discretion to fashion an adequate and reasonable 
remedy.. . . 
Anderson v. Doms. 1999 UT App 207 ^ [20,984 P.2d 392,398 ("Anderson II"). When issues 
are left open by the appellate court a trial court has discretion in how to deal with those 
issues. Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Therefore, this issue, which was apparently left open by the court of appeals, seems 
to be one of those questions contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in Pena when it stated: 
Although the universe of questions presented for review has often been 
characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact or law, 
there is really a third category - the application of law to fact or, stated more 
fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach 
of a given rule of law. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. Under this standard, this Court should afford some deference to the 
rulings of the trial court. Id. at 937-38. 
On the cross-appeal, Anderson presents the following issues: 
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that rescission was the appropriate remedy 
despite the fact that neither Anderson nor Doms could be returned to the positions they 
occupied before the sale of the property? 
Standard of Review: While this issue may also appear to be a mixed question of fact and law, 
it should be reviewed under a correction of error standard. When confronted with this issue 
by Anderson, the trial court stated that it read the court of appeals' opinion in Anderson II 
as requiring rescission. (Videotape of June 29,2000 hearing.) Therefore, the trial court did 
not even exercise its discretion. On appeal, this Court should review whether interpretation 
2 
of the trial court was correct. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 654 (Utah 1995) (trial court's 
interpretation of law is subject to a correction of error standard). 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' memorandum submitted to the 
trial court before the June 29, 2000 hearing. (R. 8721-8791) 
3. If rescission was the appropriate remedy, did the trial err when it did not specifically 
determine how to allocate the burden to pay between the defendants and how much each of 
the plaintiffs should receive, i.e. how to return the parties to the positions they occupied 
before the sale? 
Standard of Review: The trial court specifically declined to examine how the benefits and 
burdens should be allocated among the parties. Because the trial court declined to examine 
the facts, this issue should also be reviewed under a correction of error standard. Lysenko 
v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' memorandum submitted to the 
trial court before the June 29, 2000 hearing. (R. 8721-8791) 
4. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Anderson was not entitled to rent for the 
years Doms occupied the land, despite the court of appeals' directive to award rent to 
Anderson? 
Standard of Review: On this issue the trial court refused to follow the directive of the court 
of appeals in Anderson II that Plaintiffs be awarded rent for Doms' occupation of the 
property. Pronouncements of the appellate court "become the law of the case and must be 
followed in subsequent proceedings." Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P2d at 185, quoting 
3 
Slattervv.Covev&Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, when the trial 
court refuses to follow the directive of the appellate court, a correction of error standard 
should apply. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' memorandum submitted to the 
trial court before the June 29, 2000 hearing and in memoranda submitted to the trial court 
after the hearing. (R. 8721-8791) 
5. Did the trial court err when it awarded a refund of taxes paid on the property refunded 
to Doms? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's award of a refund of taxes to Doms should be subject 
to a correction of error standard. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 2000 UT 58, [^23, 7 P.3d 783, 788 
(trial court's determination of damages which involved a legal determination is subject to a 
correction of error standard). 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' memorandum submitted to the 
trial court before the June 29, 2000 hearing and in memoranda submitted to the trial court 
after the hearing. (R. 8721-8791 & 8833-8841) 
6. Did the trial court err when it awarded prejudgment interest on the earnest money, down 
payment and taxes to Doms? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's award of judgment interest to Doms should be subject 
to a correction of error standard. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, %23, 7 P.3d 783, 788 
(trial court's determination of damages which involved a legal determination is subject to a 
correction of error standard). 
4 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' memorandum submitted to the 
trial court before the June 29, 2000 hearing and in memoranda submitted to the trial court 
after the hearing. (R. 8721-8791 & 8835-8841) The trial court only allocated 2 hours for the 
hearing or trial on remand. (R. 8714) There was no presentation of facts but only argument 
based on the parties memos (see also R. 8793). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to this case is 
contained in the text or the addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
1
 The Statement of Facts in Doms' brief contains a number of factual inaccuracies. 
Specifically: 
In paragraph e, Doms states that Plaintiffs received $82,500 payment on the 
purchase price but does not indicate the source of these payments. The payments were 
one-half from Doms and one-half from McCoy. (Exhibits 21 & 22) Therefore, Doms 
contributed $41,250 to the purchase of his one-half interest in the property. 
In paragraphs f and g, Doms indicates that monthly payments of $2,266.25 were 
made but does not indicate the source of these payments. 
Paragraph m states "After Doms paid all delinquent taxes, penalties and costs, 
Summit County conveyed the property to Domcoy by Quit Claim Deed." There is no 
evidence in the record as to who paid the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. Since 
the taxes were assessed against the corporation, the corporation is the person who would 
have paid these taxes and penalties, etc. If Doms had advanced the money to the 
corporation to make these payments, there is no evidence of such advancement. Further, 
that would create a new and separate cause of action by Doms against the corporation for 
return of the funds that he now claims were advanced by him to the corporation. 
Paragraph n states "conveyance of the property from Summit County to Doms 
after tax sale resulted in Doms 'holding clear title to the property." As Doms indicates in 
paragraph o, the tax sale was challenged and the case was not a "quiet title" action but 
resulted in a determination that the tax sale was void. It is illogical that a deed from a 
(continued...) 
5 
When defendants Doms and McCoy (hereinafter "Doms" or "Defendants") failed to 
make payments required by a trust deed note secured by property known as Rossi Hills in 
Summit County, plaintiffs Scott and the Estate of D. C. Anderson (hereinafter "Anderson" 
or "Plaintiffs" (and includes plaintiffs Ellen .Anderson and Jeanne Scott)) filed an action to 
foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage. (R. 1-9) A default judgment was entered against both 
defendants on January 21, 1988. (R.34-40) Four months later, on April 22,1988, defendant 
Doms moved the court to set aside the judgment. (R. 49-52) The court granted Doms' 
motion and on June 20, 1988, entered an order setting aside the judgment with respect to 
Doms.2 (R. 126,7) 
Before the motion to set aside the default judgment had been filed, Doms filed an 
^...continued) 
corporation that acquires title in a void sale would create "clear title to the property" for 
nothing would have or could have been transferred by reason of a void sale. Therefore, 
the conclusion in paragraph o, "the tax sale was found to have no effect whatsoever on 
the ultimate outcome of the case," is true; the void deed could not have an effect on the 
case or the title. 
Paragraph v(vi) states "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the 
original buyers of the property and as a successor-in-interest to McCoy and Domcoy." 
There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Doms is a successor-in-interest to Mr. McCoy. 
In fact, Mr. McCoy's undivided one-half interest was sold by the sheriff at a sheriffs sale 
approved by the court. In addition, there is no evidence of an assignment of Domcoy's 
rights to payment to Doms and the corporation is now extinct and could not transfer any 
interest to payments made by it to Mr. Doms. 
These errors were pointed out to the trial court. (R. 8721-8791) and exhibits 
attached to memo. 
2
 On October 21, 1988, the court issued an order of sale directing the sale of 
McCoys interest. After timely notice and publication, McCoy's one-half interest was 
sold on December 12, 1988. After a hearing, an amended deficiency judgment was 
entered against McCoy on January 24, 1991. (R. 5146-7) McCoy did not contest the 
default judgment or the deficiency judgment and is not a party to any appeal. 
6 
answer and counterclaim on January 29,1988. (R. 41) However, to comply with the default 
judgment, Doms had to file a certificate of compliance which stated that the answer and 
counterclaim were not "officially accepted" by the trial court until June 1, 1988. (R. 76-78) 
On June 15, 1988, Doms filed an amended counterclaim, asserting only a claim for 
rescission. (R. 102-05) A seconded amended counterclaim contained causes of action for 
rescission, lost profits and fraud.3 (R. 237) 
Following motions for dismissal and summary judgment, all of which were denied, 
plaintiffs demanded that Doms elect his remedy. Thereafter, at the commencement of the 
three-day trial on April 17, 1990, and during the trial, the motion was renewed and Doms 
elected to proceed on rescission. (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued 
a memorandum decision in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 
4244 et seq.) Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose of 
determining if a violation of the covenant against encumbrances existed and, if one was 
found, determining damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R. 7753 
et seq.) The bench trial was held on August 21, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the court issued 
the first of five memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 4348 et seq.) 
Finally, on June 23, 1992, the court issued its final Second Amended Findings and 
Conclusions and Second Amended Judgment. (R. 6874 et seq.). Final judgment was entered 
on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-6907) The second amended findings and judgment denied 
3
 Domsf second amended counterclaim did not seek damages for breach of the 
covenants in the deed but referred to the alleged breach only as a ground for rescission. 
7 
Doms' request for rescission, awarded Doms $83,000 in damages as a result of the 
encumbrances on the property along with $101.50 in costs and awarded plaintiffs $41,333.20 
in attorney fees and costs, plus interest. 
Doms appealed the trial court's judgment and Plaintiffs cross-appealed. On 
November 4,1994, the court of appeals issued a memorandum decision. Anderson v. Doms, 
Case No. 920653CA (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (Anderson I) (Addendum A.) The court did not 
resolve all the issues and remanded the case "for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in Doms pursuing his 
counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find from the evidence presented that the appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of 
rescission." Anderson I, slip op. at 3 (Addendum A). However, the court also noted that if 
the trial court did not rescind the transaction, the trial court's 
findings and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening 
conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his counterclaims 
and the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs 
sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the 
property and any damages for breach of the title warranties. 
Anderson I, Slip op. at 3 n.2. In other words, if the trial court did not find rescission, it was 
required to reexamine and support its conclusions on a variety of issues all of which 
concerned whether Doms, in fact, properly held title to the property. 
Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court which was 
denied, Anderson v. Doms, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), presumably because the case had 
not yet been fully resolved pending the outcome of the court of appeals remand order. 
8 
On remand, the trial court received filings from both sides and held a hearing to 
resolve the outstanding issues. It then issued a Memorandum Decision on April 26,1996 (R. 
8499-8504) and "Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as per the 
Memorandum Decision" on May 31, 1996, which denied Doms's claim for rescission and 
concluding that plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission. (R. 8335.) 
The court then entered an order on Sept. 8,1997, which concluded that Doms did hold clear 
title to the property. (R. 8533-36) Doms again appealed the trial court's rulings and 
Plaintiffs cross-appealed. 
Without benefit of oral argument, the court of appeals issued its decision on June 24, 
1999. Anderson v. Doms. 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 ("Anderson II". Addendum B). 
In that decision the court of appeals first dispensed with several arguments raised by 
Plaintiffs in their cross-appeal and their response to Doms' appeal by simply stating that 
because of the resolution of the laches issue, "we do not address plaintiffs' alternative 
arguments." Anderson II 1999 UT App 207, ^  1, 984 P.2d at 394 n. 1. The court of appeals 
next relieved Doms of his obligation to marshal the evidence to show that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ [10, 984 P.2d at 396. The 
court then addressed some of the trial court's findings on rescission de novo, found them to 
be lacking for a variety of reasons and substituted its own judgment that Doms was not 
barred from invoking the remedy of rescission. Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, f 11 to 17, 
984 P.2d at 396-98. Finally, on the issue of attorney fees, the court of appeals concluded 
that Doms was not entitled to any attorney fees, affirmed the trial court's award of fees and 
9 
costs to incurred by Plaintiffs in obtaining the default judgment, and vacated all other awards 
to Plaintiffs.4 Anderson II 1999 UT App 207, [^22 - 23, 984 P.2d at 398-99. Plaintiffs' 
petition for rehearing was denied with a statement that all damages based on breach of 
contract had been vacated by the court's decision. (Addendum C) Plaintiffs' petition for a 
writ of certiorari was denied by the Utah Supreme Court on January 27, 2000. Anderson v. 
Poms. 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000). 
After remand to the trial court, both sides submitted memoranda addressing how the 
trial court should implement the court of appeals' decision in Anderson II (R. 8599-8791.) 
Judge Robert Hilder, who had replaced the original judge, held a hearing on June 29, 2000 
and issued an oral ruling.5 (R. 8833-34.) Between July 27, 2000 and September 28, 2000, 
both sides filed motions to modify the trial court's oral ruling. (R. 8848-51; 8898-8906). 
Despite requests from both sides to enter a final judgement, the trial court did not rule on the 
motions and reduce its ruling to a final order until July 7, 2001. On July 7, 2001, Judge 
Hilder denied both motions and entered a Modified Judgment and Minute Entry. (R. 8948-
52; Addendum D.) 
In the Modified Judgment, the trial court ordered rescission and stated that the court 
of appeals had held that Doms was "fully entitled to all amounts paid under the contract" and 
the trial court would not rule otherwise. (R. 8950-paragraph #2) The trial court also ordered 
4
 Other parts of Anderson II will be given in detail in the Argument section of this 
brief. 
5
 The original trial judge, Judge John Rokich, had retired during the pendency of 
the second appeal. 
10 
Doms to tender back to Plaintiffs the property subject to receiving $ 10,000 in earnest money 
and $72,500 in down payment, with interest on both sums. (R. 8950) The trial court ruled 
that interest payments made under the trust deed note were not recoverable by Doms. (R. 
8950 paragraph #4) Judge Hilder refused to award Plaintiffs the fair rental value of the 
properly despite the court of appeals' direction that rent be given to Plaintiffs. (R. 8951 
paragraph #5) The trial court's order also stated, "The Court chooses not to revisit the 
attorney's fees issue as such fees were necessary to set aside the Default Judgment in this 
case; therefore no award is made for recovery of said attorney's fees by Defendant Doms." 
(R. 8951) Finally, the trial court awarded post-judgment interest on the amounts awarded. 
(R. 8948-52.) 
Doms again appealed the trial court's judgment and Plaintiffs cross-appealed. 
FACTS 
This case involves undeveloped property, known as Rossi Hills, in Summit County. 
It was owned by plaintiffs Scott and Anderson as tenants in common. (Exhibit 27) 6 
Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of 
himself and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) The sale was 
consummated and a deed was executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and D. C. 
Anderson and his wife, Ellen Anderson, as grantors, in favor of Doms and McCoy, as 
grantees, each with an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1) On the March 10, 1982, 
6
 All exhibits referred to in this brief were admitted at trial. Exhibit lists are 
contained in R7081-82 and R437-38. 
11 
Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 in favor of "D. 
C. Anderson as to an undivided one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half 
interest." (Exhibit 3) The note was secured by a trust deed executed by Doms and McCoy 
on the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson. (Exhibit 2) 
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified that he and Doms walked the property in 
advance of the sale and observed the loop road and the other features later claimed to be 
undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that all claimed encroachments were 
plainly visible. (R. 7653, 7658, 7661, 7662, 7663, 7664, 7667, 7686) 
On October 30, 1981, five months before their purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and 
McCoy created a corporation called Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 31) The corporation 
held annual meetings for the years 1983 (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 (Exhibit 37). 
Doms and McCoy, through Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business 
in of Utah as indicated by their attorney. (R. 7539-41; 7560) 
On August 30,1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy Enterprises. 
(Exhibit 16) Shortly thereafter, Domcoy developed a joint venture agreement for the 
development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 81, 82) From 1982 
Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, and a tax sale was 
conducted. (Exhibit 5 to the Complaint in consolidated case #10066.) Doms, McCoy and 
Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note under the note which 
precipitated the foreclosure action. (Exhibit 6) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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In response to the issue raised by Doms, Anderson first argues that the trial court 
correctly ruled that Doms was not entitled to a refund of interest payments which were made 
on money loaned to him by Plaintiffs. In this case, Plaintiffs acted as both sellers and 
lenders and, as lenders, they had a right to interest payments for the use of their money, just 
as a third party lender would be entitled to interest for the use of its money. While Utah 
courts have not directly addressed this issue, courts in at least one other jurisdiction have 
stated that in a case where one party has the dual status of lender and seller, rescission of the 
property transaction does not negate the lender's right to interest on the loan. Cases cited 
by Doms on this issue do not involve a circumstance such as, the multiple contracts at issue 
in this case. 
Additionally, Anderson contends that Doms' argument that the trial court was 
required under Anderson II to award him interest payments made under the Trust Deed Note 
misconstrues the holding of the court of appeals in Anderson II. Application of standard 
rules of grammatical construction to the sentence at issue in Anderson II show that Doms' 
interpretation is not accurate or logical. 
On the cross-appeal, Anderson first argues that the trial court erred when it did not 
engage in the analysis required by Anderson II to determine whether the parties could be 
returned to their pre-contract positions by rescission. In Anderson IL the court of appeals 
stated, "'How [returning the parties to their pre-contract positions] is to be accomplished, or 
indeed whether is can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court. . ..'" 
Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ [20, 984 P.2d at 398, quoting OngInt'UU.S.A.)Inc. v. 11th 
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stated, "'How [returning the parties to their pre-contract positions] is to be accomplished, or 
indeed whether is can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court . . ..'" 
Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207,1J20,984 P.2d at 398, quoting OngInt'iqj.S.A.)Inc.v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P2d 447,457 (Utah 1993). Rescission requires that the parties be returned 
to the status quo that existed before the contract. An examination of whether the pre-contract 
status quo could be attained was not undertaken by the trial court, but was necessary given 
the ruling of the appellate court. 
Had such an examination been performed by the trial court, Anderson contends that 
rescission would have been foreclosed because the parties cannot be returned to the status 
quo. Plaintiffs have lost the opportunity due to the passage of time to challenge 
encroachments on the property which matured during Doms' occupation of the property. 
Plaintiffs cannot be returned to the pre-contract status quo because one the original Plaintiffs, 
D.C. Anderson, has died leaving an insolvent estate. This will mean that the other Plaintiff, 
Dan Scott, will be required to bear all of the burden of repayment - clearly putting him in a 
position far worse than he occupied before the contract. Finally, Doms is record owner of 
only one-half of the property and therefore his ability to convey all of the property is in 
question. 
Anderson next argues in ordering rescission, the trial court should have determined 
the rights and responsibilities of the individual parties. The trial court's failure to undertake 
this task means that the parties have no way to implement the rescission which the trial court 
ordered. Additionally, the trial court's refusal to allocate the benefits and burdens means that 
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Doms will probably reap a windfall while one the Plaintiffs, Dan Scott, will bear the full 
burden of repaying the refund to Doms. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erroneously refused to award them the fair rental 
value of the property. Anderson II clearly stated that Plaintiffs should be awarded the fair 
rental value of the property despite the fact that Doms purchased the land for development 
as residential property and no development had occurred. Yet, the trial court ruled that "raw 
land" had no rental value. The trial court could have offset interest payments under the Trust 
Deed Note against the rent as prior Utah cases have, but it did not adopt this approach. 
The trial court should not have ordered a refund of taxes while Doms occupied the 
property. First, no evidence was presented regarding the proportion of the taxes which Doms 
actually paid therefore the court could not know whether he was being returned to the status 
quo or receiving a windfall. Additionally, at least one court from another jurisdiction has 
held that taxes are not refundable because they are obligations incurred while the buyer 
occupied the property. 
Finally, Anderson asserts that the trial court should not have awarded Doms 
prejudgment interest on the amounts refunded to him. Utah case law states that pre-judgment 
interest should not be awarded in cases in equity. No statute permits prejudgment interest 
in equity case and Doms disavowed the contract and therefore, cannot claim interest as a 





THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DOMS IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO INTEREST PAYMENTS FOR MONEY LOANED TO HIM 
UNDER THE TRUST DEED NOTE. 
In the first point of his brief, Doms claims that the trial court should have awarded 
him payments which were made by Doms, McCoy and Domcoy for monies loaned to Doms 
and McCoy under the Trust Deed Note. On this point Judge Hilder ruled, 
4. Payments made pursuant to the Trust deed Note which were interest 
payments shall not be recoverable by Defendant Doms. It. is the Court's 
opinion that had the money been borrowed from any other party, Defendant 
Doms would have had to repay it. The Court cannot see a legal basis for 
allowing this interest on the Trust Deed Note to be returned to defendant Doms 
and so the interest payments shall not be recovered by Doms. 
(R. 8950-51; Addendum D.) Doms now argues that the interest payments made for money 
loaned under the Trust Deed Note should be returned as part of the rescission and that the 
court of appeals' decision in Anderson II required a return of the interest payments. Doms' 
first argument is unsupported by the case law and his second argument miisreads the court of 
appeals' opinion in Anderson II. 
A. The trial court correctly ruled that Doms is not entitled to the return of interest paid 
under the Trust Deed Note because the interest was paid for Doms' and McCoy ys use of 
Plaintiffs' money. 
What the trial court understood and what Doms refuses to recognize is that the 
contested monies paid under the Trust Deed Note were not paid for the land but rather were 
paid for Doms' use of Plaintiffs' money. This case presents the unusual situation in which 
the Plaintiffs/Sellers not only sold and transferred possession of their property to Doms and 
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McCoy but also, in a separate document, advanced Doms and McCoy the bulk of the 
purchase money, through credit, to buy the property. In other words, Plaintiffs were sellers 
and lenders for Doms and McCoy. In Point I of his brief, Doms now claims that he should 
be reimbursed for monies which he admits were interest payments made to the Plaintiffs for 
sums loaned by the Plaintiffs to Doms and McCoy. Doms should not receive this money 
because the funds were not payments of principal toward the purchase of the property but 
were payments of interest for the use of Plaintiffs' money. 
While no Utah case has directly addressed this aspect of this issue7, courts in at least 
one other jurisdiction have held that interest paid by a buyer on money loaned by a seller 
should not be returned in a rescission action. In Libassi v. Chelll 615 N. Y.S.2d 75,76 (N. Y. 
App. Div. 1994), the trial court rescinded a transaction and, despite the buyers' alleged fraud, 
awarded the buyers not only their down payment but also interest which they had paid on a 
purchase money mortgage provided by the sellers. In reversing the award of interest to the 
buyers and awarding unpaid interest to the sellers, the appellate division of the New York 
Supreme Court stated: 
The buyers argue, primarily, that because they were supposedly prevented 
from developing the property as they had intended as the result of the conduct 
of the sellers, they should not have to pay interest on the purchase money 
mortgage . . . . We disagree. 
The sellers have a dual status in this case: they are both the transferors 
of real property to and the creditors of the buyers by virtue of their being 
purchase money mortgagees. In essence, they loaned the buyers the sum of 
7
 The Utah Supreme Court has permitted interest payments to represent the 
reasonable rental value of property. 
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$280,000, and this sum was to be repaid on stated terms as part of an arms-
length business transaction. There is no reason in law or in equity why the 
terms of this loan should not be enforced. 
615N.Y.S.2dat77. See also Bechard v. Bolton. 24 N.W.2d 422.423 (Mich. 1946) (interest 
payments made on money loaned by the sellers should not be returned to the buyers but 
should be used with tax payments made by buyers to offset rental value); Larsen v. Potter. 
571 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (upholding lower court's decision to 
allowing sellers to keep all prior mortgage payments as fair rental value); and Ohio Valley 
Trust Co. v. Allison. 89 A. 1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914) ("[After rescission, Sellers] have their 
property again, and required to repay to the [buyer] only the money which they actually 
received on account of the purchase...", not money received as interest paid on the balance 
of the purchase price.). 
Just as in Libassi. Doms here claimed that the planned development was made 
impossible by sellers' conduct but that does not alleviate the obligation incurred under the 
trust deed note for the use of the sellers' money to finance the deal. Addendum 3 attached 
to Doms' memorandum in the trial court and reproduced on pages 15 and 16 of his brief 
clearly show that every cent of the $72,520 was paid as interest on the Trust Deed Note. 
None of this money went toward the purchase of the property-it was all payment for the use 
of Plaintiffs' money. Here, as in Libassi. Plaintiffs, as sellers, forfeited all ownership rights 
in their property and, as lenders, they also advanced Doms and McCoy the money which was 
used to purchase the property. Rather than securing a loan from a financial institution to 
procure the property, Doms and McCoy were allowed to use Plaintiffs' money to buy 
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Plaintiffs' property. Doms is not entitled to the return of any of the interest monies. August 
15, 2002oms had the opportunity to develop and exploit the value of the property he 
controlled. All the potential profit and "upside" was totally within his control. This 
opportunity has a cost, it is interest. 
Additionally, Doms has not demonstrated that he advanced any of the monies in 
question-totaling, by Doms' calculation, $72,520.00. Indeed, the presumption would be that, 
at most Doms paid only one-half of the sums up to the transfer of the property to Domcoy 
on August 30, 1983. (Exhibit 16) This would represent an amount of $19,263.13. After 
transfer of the property to Domcoy, all of the payments would have presumably originated 
from the corporation ($33,993.75). Therefore, Doms is entitled to none of these funds. 
In support of his claim, Doms cites nine cases from Utah and other jurisdictions. 
While Doms gives a small bit of parenthetical information about each case, what Doms fails 
to state is that only one of the cases apparently involves multiple contracts like this case. All 
of the other cases cited by Doms apparently involve a single installment land contract.8 In 
8The term "apparently" is used because the recitation of facts in some of the cases 
does not clearly state what type of transaction occurred between purchaser and vendor. 
However, none of the cases states that a trust deed note was involved. See, e.g., Breuer-
Harrison Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (Court refers to an 
"executory" real estate contract); Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984) 
(Uniform Real Estate Contract); Lee v. Young, 987 P.2d 519, 520 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (a 
single purchase contract); Robison v. Katz, 610 P.2d 201, 205 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) 
(Court mentions only a single"real estate contract"); Farmer v. Groves, 555 P.2d 1252, 
1254 (Or. 1976) ("land sale contract"); Lverla v. Watts, 482 P.2d 318, 320 (Nev. 1971) 
("written contract of sale" for the sale of stock); Matanuska Valley Bank v. Abernathy, 
445 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1968) (Court mentions only a single "sale contract"); Miller v. 
Remior, 383 P.2d 596, 597 (Idaho 1963) (an executory "contract for the sale and purchase 
(continued...) 
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contrast, as the trial court correctly stated, this case involved not only a conveyancing 
document involving six parties but a separate financing document-the trust deed note 
involving only four parties and executed by Doms as only one of the four. 
The only case cited by Doms which may involve multiple contracts is Duganv. Jones, 
724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). However, a trust deed note is never mentioned in that case and 
multiple contracts seem to be involved because the purchasers assumed a mortgage under 
their purchase agreement with the sellers. 724 P.2d at 956. Furthermore, Dugan actually 
seems to support Plaintiffs' position because the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's disallowance of defendant's interest on payments made on the purchase price. The 
court seemed to conclude that this roughly equated to fair rental value of the properly. 724 
P.2d at 957. In the final analysis, Doms has cited no case to this Court which holds that 
payments made for the use of money under a separate contract are refundable in the case of 
a subsequent rescission. 
In this transaction, Plaintiffs were not only the sellers of the property, they also acted 
as lenders. Just as third-party lenders would expect payment in the form of interest for the 
use of their money, Plaintiffs, in their role as lenders were entitled to receive compensation 
for the use of their money by Doms and McCoy. As Judge Hilder noted, had Doms and 
McCoy been required to borrow money from a bank to pay for the land pmrchase, they would 
have had to pay interest for the use of the bank's money and that interest would not have 
8(... continued) 
of real property"). 
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been refunded under any theory of rescission. Doms' payment for the use of Plaintiffs' 
money is not refundable. If it were refundable, Doms would not only have had the free use 
of Plaintiffs' property for twenty years but also the free use of Plaintiffs' money for the same 
period. 
B. Doms has confused interest on judgments with interest paid under the Trust Deed Note. 
In the second point in his brief, Doms claims that the trial court was bound by the law 
of the case to order repayment of the interest payments made under the Trust Deed Note. In 
Anderson IL the court of appeals stated, "We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for 
a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus 
interest." 1999 UT App 207, ^  21, 984 P.2d at 398. Doms construes this sentence to mean 
that the trial court was required to give him a refund of the interest payments made under the 
Trust Deed Note as well as judgment interest on all the monies awarded him. Doms' 
interpretation strains credulity. 
The trial court interpreted the phrase "plus interest" to mean that Doms should receive 
interest on any judgment awarded to him. This interpretation is logical (but, as will be set 
out below, should have only been applied to post-judgment interest). Had the court of 
appeals meant for Doms to receive a refund on the interest payments, the opinion would have 
specifically stated that. Additionally, the term "plus interest" would then have been used a 
second time to denote that Doms should receive interest on any judgment. By using the term 
only once, the court of appeals presumably meant that Doms should receive only one form 
of interest-either interest on the judgment or a refund of interest payments but not both. 
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Indeed, applying standard rules of construction, an argument can be made that 
Plaintiffs, not Doms, should receive interest on their judgment. As stated in L & B 
Construction Co. v. Ragan Enterprises, Inc.. 482 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ga. 1997), "[u]nder 
accepted rules of grammatical construction, modifiers... are placed next to the word or 
phrase that they modify." (Emphasis added.) See also Pearson v. United States, 389 F.2d 
684, 687 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968) (United States Supreme Court case, Stovall v. Pernio, 388 U.S. 
293 (1967), has uniformly been interpreted based on the position of the modifier)and Strunk 
and White, The Elements of Style, 30 (3d ed. 1979) ("Modifiers should come, if possible, 
next to the word they modify.")- Therefore, the rules of grammar support the notion that 
interest should be given for the rent owed to Plaintiffs because that is the phrase closest to 
the term "plus interest". 
Finally, even if Doms' tortured construction of the sentence is accurate, a trial court 
retains some discretion in implementing an appellate court decision. In Gildea v. Guardian 
Title Co., 2001 UT 75, «[9, 31 P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme Court stated the law of the case 
doctrine "is not applied inflexibly. Indeed, this court need not apply the doctrine to promote 
efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise 
precedent." In this case, Judge Hilder clearly saw that awarding Doms a refund for payments 
made for the use of Plaintiffs' money would be unjust and ruled accordingly. Judge Hilder's 
application of the law to the facts should be accorded some deference because of the 
discretion given him by the court of appeals in Anderson II. Doms has not shown that Judge 
Hilder abused that discretion. Doms is entitled to return of his principal payments only if 
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recission can be accomplished. He is however required to pay rent and Anderson is entitled 
to interest on the rent. The interest Doms paid can be applied against the rent, whatever that 
maybe, as an offset. 
PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL 
INTRODUCTION 
Two points must be emphasized at the outset of this portion of this brief First, the 
court of appeals apparently invested the trial court with broad discretion to determine the 
appropriate remedy in this case including the possibility that rescission is not appropriate. 
Specifically, the court of appeals stated: 
On remand, the trial court should determine what is necessary to restore 
the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the contract. 
See Bergstrom[v. Moore] 677 P.2d at 1125 (affirming rescission of contract 
and placing partes in original positions by allowing recovery of payments 
already made under the contract). In fashioning an appropriate remedy for 
rescission, the rule 
is equitable , and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of 
the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether 
it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial 
court. . .. Ong Int'l (USA) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 
447, 457 (Utah 1993). 
Anderson. 1999 UT App 207,1J20, 984 P.2d at 398 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs interpreted 
this part of the opinion to mean that the trial court could order rescission only if the parties 
can be returned to the positions they occupied when the contract was entered since that had 
never been determined. Among other arguments that Plaintiffs will address below is that the 
parties cannot be returned to their original positions for a variety of reasons and therefore, 
rescission is not an appropriate remedy. 
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The second point to remember at this juncture is that no fraud occurred here. Doms 
abandoned any claim of fraud. In many of the cases the remedy of rescission is imposed 
against a party who has committed fraud. No such bias should be applicable in this case 
because no fraud occurred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED RESCISSION 
BECAUSE THE PARTIES COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THE 
POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED BEFORE THE CONTRACTS. 
The trial court ordered rescission without assessing whether the parties could be 
returned to their pre-contract positions. In fact, during the hearing on this matter, the trial 
court expressly stated that it doubted any judgment it ordered would be collectable because 
of the current positions of the parties, particularly the estate of Plaintiff Anderson which is 
insolvent. (Tape of June 29, 2000 hearing) Given the doubts expressed by the trial court 
rescission should not have been ordered. 
Rescission is a remedy of last resort, available when no other suitable remedy will 
suffice and only when the parties can be returned to the status quo as it existed before the 
contract. See, e.g., 50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency. 784 P.2d 1162, 
1170-71 (Utah 1989). The ability to return of the parties to the pre-contract status quo is a 
prerequisite for rescission, and reguires a factual inquiry. For example, in 50 West 
Broadway, a landowner had conveyed property to the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City under an agreement by which the agency was to allocate as many as 100 parking spaces 
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to the landowner in any future structure on the conveyed property. 784 P.2d at 1163-70. 
When, after subsequent reconveyances and development of the property, parking was not 
allocated to the original landowner, the landowner sought rescission of the original 
conveyance. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that rescission was not 
possible because the parties could not be returned to the pre-contract status quo. The court 
stated: 
To rescind a partially executed contract, the party seeking rescission 
usually must be able to place the other party in the same position that existed 
before the execution of the contract "Generally, if the parties cannot be put 
back in statu quo, a contract can be rescinded only where the clearest and 
strongest reason and equity imperatively demand it." 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 
§ 514, at 998 (1964). That is not the case here. Alternative remedies do exist. 
Furthermore, it is clear beyond peradventure that the parties cannot be returned 
to the status quo ante. 
50 West Broadway, 784 P.2d at 1170-71 (citations omitted). 
Previously in this case, the trial court had ruled that rescission was not the appropriate 
remedy for Doms but awarded him damages. The court of appeals discarded many of the 
court's findings and held that rescission may be permitted if the parties can be returned to 
the status quo. As noted above, the court of appeals granted the trial court broad discretion 
on remand to determine if the parties could be returned to the status quo which existed before 
the sale of the property. Had the trial court examined this issue, it would have concluded, 
as the trial court in 50 West Broadway did, that the parties could not be returned to the status 
quo that existed before they entered into the contract for a variety of reasons. Therefore, as 
in 50 West Broadway, rescission was not available. 
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A. Plaintiffs cannot be returned to the status quo because encroachments on the property 
have matured during Doms' occupancy and cannot now be challenged. 
In Utah the period to obtain boundary by acquiescence is twenty years. Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Utah 1998). Doms acquired the subject property in 1982. 
Doms would have been able to challenge any encumbrance on the property constructed after 
1962. However, Doms' counterclaim asserting rescission was not filed until 1988, the trial 
court denied rescission in 1992 and again in 1996. Therefore, after the court of appeals held 
that rescission should be permitted, Plaintiffs can only challenge encumbrances built after 
1980. 
However, Plaintiffs contend that encumbrances on the property matured during Doms' 
occupancy and he did nothing to remove them. (R. 8739-8942) Plaintiffs are now foreclosed 
from instituting such action. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot be returned to the status quo which 
existed prior to the contract which makes rescission impossible. 
B. Plaintiffs cannot be returned to the status quo because one of the Plaintiffs died and the 
estate has long been settled. 
In the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,, Judge Rokich ruled 
that Doms' second amended counterclaim against the estate of D.C. Anderson was barred 
by the three-month filing period of limitation for claims against an estate under Utah Code 
Ann. §75-3-803 (1993). (R. 6884) Judge Rokich did not determine how the statute affected 
rescission. However, the statute contains no exemption for claims based on rescission and 
therefore must bar Doms' claim of rescission. This question was not addressed by the court 
of appeals. 
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Additionally, the question remains, who is to pay the share of D.C. Anderson whose 
estate now has a federal tax lien against it and is, for all intents and purposes, now insolvent. 
It would be patently unfair to require Plaintiff Dan Scott to shoulder the increased burden. 
Indeed, to require Scott to bear an increased burden would mean that he would not be placed 
in the status quo which existed before the contract. 
C. Subsequent transfers of the property after its purchase by Doms and McCoy foreclose 
rescission. 
The court of appeals resolved the issue of ownership by simply stating that Doms is 
the owner of the property and the successor to Domcoy. Anderson II, 1999 UT App 207, 
^[21, 984 P.2d at 398 n.12. However, Doms originally only received an undivided one-half 
interest in the property (Exhibit 1) and McCoy, the other one-half owner, has made no 
appearance in this case and did not request rescission. Indeed, the records of Summit County 
indicate that Doms currently only owns one-half of the property. (Addendum E) (R. 8791) 
In cases involving transfers of property, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "The law 
is well-settled that one electing to rescind a contract must tender back to the other contracting 
party whatever property of value he has received." Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 
(Utah 1968). Here, because Doms is the record titleholder of only one-half of the property, 
he cannot tender back the entire property and he cannot return the Plaintiffs to statu quo that 
existed before the contract. 
Plaintiffs raised the issue of returning the parties to their pre-contract positions but no 
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court has addressed it. The court of appeals stated in a footnote that Doms is the "successor 
in interest to McCoy and Domcoy." Anderson. 1999 UT App 207, ^21,984 P.2d at 398 n. 12. 
This statement is not supported by the record. As Judge Rokich stated in a supplemental 
finding of fact which was not disputed by Doms or set aside by the court of appeals, 
"Defendant Michael R. McCoy defaulted in this case, a judgment was entered against him 
(R. 34-40,572-73) and in accordance with said judgment, his undivided one-half interest was 
sold at sheriffs sale as per the Certificate of Sale which is attached hereto. There is no 
evidence that Doms made any attempt to redeem the property at any time subsequent to the 
sheriffs sale, nor did said defendant, Michael R. McCoy, join the actions for rescission or 
tender his interest in the subject real estate. Under these circumstances McCoy's former 
interest in the property could not be conveyed to the plaintiffs in any attempted rescission 
action by Doms." (R. 8741-8743) 
Had the trial court followed the edict of the court of appeals and examined whether 
the parties could be returned to their pre-contract positions, it would have found that they 
could not. Encroachments on the property which have matured without intervention by 
Doms have extinguished rights that Plaintiffs had when they conveyed the property. Because 
Doms has not instituted a quiet title action for the property and the records of Summit County 
now indicate that he does not own all of the property, he cannot place Plaintiffs in the 
position they occupied before the sale because he cannot tender back all of the property. 
Additionally, because the estate of Anderson is without funds, Plaintiff Scott will be 
required to refund all of the money. Therefore, rescission is not appropriate because the 
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parties cannot be returned to the status quo. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE ORDER OF RESCISSION WAS APPROPRIATE, THE 
TRIAL ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES. 
The trial court awarded Doms a refund of the total down payment and earnest money 
payment on the property as well as a refund on all taxes paid during the years in question. 
The trial court specifically declined to inquire into how much Doms paid for the property or 
whether Plaintiffs could refund the amounts ordered in equal shares. (Videotape of June 29, 
2000 hearing.) Indeed, Judge Hilder stated during the hearing that the award to Doms could 
probably never be paid. (Videotape of June 29, 2000 hearing.) Plaintiffs contend that, at 
most, Doms is entitled to a fraction of the earnest money, down payment and taxes. 
Utah does not require an exact return to the status quo. In Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 
955, 957 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
The rule that the rescinding party must restore the opposing party to the status 
quo is not a technical rule, but rather requires practicality in adjusting the 
rights of the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it can, 
is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court under the facts as 
found to exist by the trier of fact. 
While Dugan does not require a return to the exact pre-contract positions occupied by the 
parties, it does require a factual examination of the potential for returning the parties to 
positions which at least approximate their pre-contract positions. Additionally, Dugan surely 
cannot contemplate that one of the parties would reap a windfall while the other party bears 
an inordinate burden. Yet, that is precisely what the trial court would have found here had 
29 
it undertaken the factual examination required by Dugan. 
While the court of appeals stated that Doms is the successor in interest to the 
corporation, it also clearly stated that Doms is entitled only to "the net payments paid by him 
...." Anderson II 1999 UT App 207, f21, 984 P.2d at 398. The latter statement certainly 
can and should be read to mean that Doms should receive only what he contributed and not 
the windfall which the trial court awarded. However, the trial court refused to examine this 
issue. 
The trial court awarded Doms all sums paid for the earnest money, down payment and 
taxes despite the fact that Doms provided no evidence that he was the sole source of the 
funds. In fact, Doms ignores evidence in the record that he paid only one-half of the down 
payment. (Exhibits 21 & 22) Presumably, one-half of all of the monies paid for the purchase 
of the property did not come from Doms but came from McCoy, against whom a default 
judgment was entered. Doms presented no evidence that he had given anything of value to 
acquire the interests of McCoy or the corporation. Therefore, to allow the award to Doms 
to stand means the he will receive a windfall of double what he paid. In other words, Doms 
will not be returned to the position he occupied before the contract but to a position far better 
than he occupied before he entered into the contract. Contrary to the statement of the court 
of appeals, Doms will receive far more than the "net payments paid by him." Plaintiffs 
should not be forced to unjustly enrich Doms. 
The windfall that the court will bestow on Doms if it affirms the trial court is 
exacerbated by the fact that all of the burden of the double payment will likely fall on only 
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Scott because the estate of D.C. Anderson is, for all intents and purposes, insolvent. The trial 
court specifically refused to address which of the Plaintiffs will bear the payment burden at 
the June 29 hearing. (Tape of June 29,2000 hearing) 
Due to the trial court's failure to address the allocation of benefits and burdens under 
the ordered rescission, Doms will be in a position far better than the one he occupied before 
the contract by receiving an unjust windfall and Plaintiff Scott will be in position far worse 
than he occupied before the contract by having to pay double what he received. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFFS RENT AS REQUIRED BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
The trial court refused to follow that portion of the court of appeals' opinion which 
stated that the Plaintiffs should receive the fair rental value of the property during the time 
which Doms had exclusive control over the property. The court reasoned that the property 
was "raw ground" which was not used by Doms and therefore, it had no rental value. The 
court ignored the court of appeals' edict and the fact that Doms used the property to explore 
development and sale potential. 
The trial court's conclusion on this issue ignores statements made by the court of 
appeals. The court of appeals noted in its recitation of the background of the case that 
Plaintiffs sold Defendants a parcel of property "for residential development." Anderson II, 
1999 UT App 207, [^2, 984 P.2d at 394. Later the court stated that "Doms apparently made 
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no improvements or changes to the property...." Anderson IL 1999 UTApp 207,^21,984 
P.2d at 398. Despite this, the court of appeals ordered that Plaintiffs receive the "rental 
value" of the property. Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ (21, 984 P.2d at 398. 
Utah courts have determined that the reasonable rental value of property can include 
interest payments made under a purchase contract when the value is otherwise difficult to 
determine. Here, at the very least, the trial court should have awarded Plaintiffs the interest 
payments made by Doms and the amount paid as taxes as the reasonable rental value of the 
property. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically ratified the application of interest payments 
on a purchase contract to the fair rental value of property. In Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 
1089 (Utah 1991), the assignees of a defaulting purchaser sued the seller seeking to recover, 
inter alia, the down payment and annual payments made under a purchase contract by the 
buyer which had been forfeited to the seller on the buyer's default. 808 P.2d at 1092. The 
Utah Supreme Court recalculated the damages in the case. Concerning the fair rental value 
of the property the court simply stated, "Fair rental value during the period of occupancy: 
The trial court properly allowed [Seller] interest on the contract as an alternative to fair rental 
value." 808P.2datl096. See also Fullmer v. Blood. 546 P.2d 606, 609-10 (Utah 1976). 
The approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Bellon has been applied in 
several other jurisdictions. In fact in some of those jurisdictions, courts have extended the 
rental value to include not only interest payments made but also taxes paid by the buyer. For 
example, in Larsen v. Potter. 571 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, App. Div. 1991), the trial 
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court permitted a rescission based on substantial mutual mistake when the buyer learned, 
after the sale, that the property's boundaries differed from those represented by the seller and 
would prevent use of the property as the buyer had intended. 571 N.Y.S.2d at 122. 
However, the trial court denied the buyer recovery of past mortgage payments made to the 
seller, finding the payments to represent the fair rental value of the property. Id In affirming 
the trial court's award, the appellate division stated, "[the trial court] properly exercised its 
equitable powers to effectuate [the result of placing the parties back in the positions they 
occupied prior to the sale contract] by rescinding the note and mortgage but allowing [seller] 
to keep all prior mortgage payments as fair market rental value . . . ." 571 N.Y.S.2d at 123. 
See also Bechard v. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422,423 (Mich. 1946) ("We, therefore, hold that the 
rental value of the property should offset all interest and taxes paid . . . ."); Brink v. Larson, 
411 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (The trial court did not err when it "calculated 
the annual fair rental value by taking the actual market value of the property, multiplied by 
the interest rate agreed upon by the parties . . . .") ; Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A. 
1132,1134 (Pa. 1914) (Interest paid on purchase money balances rental value of property). 
This Court should adopt the approach authorized by the Utah Supreme Court in Bellon 
and award interest paid under the Trust Deed Note as the fair rental value but the amount 
should be increased due to the lack of any payment over the past fifteen years.9 Here, at the 
9
 Nothing has been paid under the trust deed note for over fifteen years. Apart 
from any rental value that interest on the note represents, this means that Doms has had 
the free use of Plaintiffs' property and money for this extended period. The note states 
that any installment not paid when due shall bear interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 
(continued...) 
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very least, the rental value of the property should be equivalent to the interest paid under the 
trust deed note and taxes paid during Doms occupancy of the property. However, that 
minimal formulation means that Plaintiffs will have received no rental value for the property 
for the past fifteen years-that Doms has had virtually free use of the property for fifteen 
years. The trial court should have ordered that Doms either forfeit the down payment and 
earnest money or pay the equivalent of the annual interest payments as rent for his use of the 
property for the past fifteen years. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUNDED TAXES PAID BY 
DOMS. 
The trial court also awarded Doms a refund of taxes paid on the property during his 
tenancy despite the fact that the court of appeals did not mandate a refund of taxes in 
Anderson II. That award should be reversed because Doms provided no evidence that he 
paid the taxes and it would be unfair to charge Plaintiffs taxes for an eighteen year period 
when they had no access to the property. 
On this claim also, Doms provides evidence that some taxes were paid on the property 
but does not provide any specific evidence that he personally paid those amounts. 
Furthermore, none of the taxes were paid before Doms and McCoy transferred ownership of 
the property to Domcoy. When Doms, by warranty deed, transferred the property to the 
9(...continued) 
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corporation who became the record owner, Doms was no longer required to pay taxes since 
they were the responsibility of the corporation. The corporation paid taxes to avoid a 
judgment and to protect the corporate property and the corporations' s right to occupy it. Any 
taxes paid by Doms after he reacquired the property from the corporation were voluntary and 
to protect his newly acquired ownership and cannot relate back to the transaction with the 
Plaintiffs. In effect, Doms assumed the corporation's tax duties and should not be able to 
charge Plaintiffs for these taxes. The record simply does not support Doms' claim that he 
paid the taxes. Without such evidence, Doms would reap an undeserved windfall if this 
Court were to award him compensation for taxes. 
Doms (and, presumably, the trial court) relied on Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1984), to support the award of taxes. However, that case says nothing about an award 
of taxes in a rescission action and, in fact, the words "tax" or "taxes" do not even appear in 
Bergstrom. 
Taxes paid by a buyer prior to rescission are not necessarily refundable. For example, 
in Libassi the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court stated: 
[T]here is no reason in law or in equity to shift the tax liabilities incurred by 
the buyers while they owned the property to the sellers. The [trial court] had 
a choice between requiring the sellers to absorb a tax liability relative to 
property they did not own and could not use, or requiring the buyers to absorb 
a tax liability relative to property which they did own and could use. The [trial 
court] incorrectly chose the former alternative on the theory that the buyers 
could not use the property as they planned. 
LibassL615N.Y.S.2dat77. See also Bechard v. Bolton. 24 N.W.2d 422.423 (Mich. 1946) 
(interest and taxes paid by buyer equal reasonable rental value of the property). 
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Here, Doms (and/or McCoy and/or Domcoy) did own and could use the property from 
1982 to the present and Plaintiffs had no use of, or even access to, the property. Furthermore, 
as he discovered, if Doms did not pay the taxes on the property, his right to rescission would 
not be preserved. Therefore, Doms benefitted from the payment of taxes and the Plaintiffs 
did not. Doms should not receive any refund of the taxes. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DOMS PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE EARNEST MONEY, DOWN PAYMENT 
AND TAXES. 
Finally, the trial court awarded Doms pre-judgment interest on the earnest money, 
down payment and taxes. However, that award is contrary to Utah law. Prejudgment 
interest is not awarded in equity cases such as this. 
In Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991), the assignees of a defaulting buyer 
sued the seller for equitable restitution of payments made prior to the buyer's default and 
forfeiture. Despite awarding judgment to the assignees, the trial court refused to give the 
assignees prejudgment interest. In affirming the trial court's refusal to give prejudgment 
interest, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest has been awarded indicates 
that interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property,...; 
in actions brought on a written contract, . . ., and in an action to recover a 
liquidated overpayment of water subscription charges, — In many of these 
cases, we stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance 
with well-established rules of damages. No case has been cited to us where we 
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have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant case, which 
is for equitable relief.... in view of the highly equitable nature of this action 
where the court has discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be returned 
to the defaulting vendee, we find no error in the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Bellon. 808 P.2d at 1097 (citations omitted). 
Doms cited no case which would justify an award of prejudgment interest in this 
case.10 Indeed, the only authority cited in the relevant portions of Doms' memorandum is to 
the contact interest rate statute because Doms cannot claim interest under a contract which 
he has disavowed. BLT Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978). 
Furthermore, prejudgment interest would simply be inappropriate here because the principal 
amount cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. BeUon, 808 P.2d at 1097. All 
of the amounts presented by Doms in the trial court were or are subject to dispute. Therefore, 
just as in BeUon, the discretion in determining the amounts, leads to inaccuracy which 
forecloses prejudgment interest. Interest on Doms' award should have only run from the date 
of that award. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request that this Court: 
(1) affirm that portion of the trial court's decision which denies Doms a refund of interest 
paid under the Trust Deed Note, and/or 
10Doms apparently based his claim for interest on the statement in the court of 
appeals' opinion, "We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a determination 
and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest." 1999 
UT App 207,1J21, 984 P.2d at 398. Doms apparently would argue that the "interest" 
referred to in this sentence covers both interest paid under the Trust Deed Note and 
prejudgment interest on the award. This issue was addressed in Point IB above. 
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(2) reverse the trial court's refusal to examine issues concerning whether rescission is 
appropriate and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the parties 
can be returned to their pre-contract positions, and/or 
(3) if rescission is appropriate, reverse the trial court's refusal to address the allocation of 
burdens and benefits and remand to the trial court for a specific determination of the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties, and/or 
(4) reverse the trial court's refusal to award fair rental value of the propeity to the Plaintiffs 
and remand to the trial court for a determination of the fair rental value, and/or 
(5) reverse the trial court's award of a refund of taxes to Doms, and/or 
(6) reverse the trial court's award of prejudgment interest to Doms. 
DATED this /"Slay of August, 2002. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Larry Af Kirkham < 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing brief of 
appellees/cross appellants were either hand-delivered or mailed by U.S. mail, first-class 
postage prepaid, th is /^day of August, 2002, to: 
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Utah Court oi Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 
NOV 0 4 tSS1! 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Cleric of the Court 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E, Poms, 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, and 
Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake 
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as 
Summit County Auditor; Gump t Ayers Real 
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor 
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms; 
unknown defendants described as John 
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 






Case No. 920653-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 4, 1994} 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, 
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson, 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's 
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his 
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the counterclaim 
include whether the statute of limitations barred the 
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date 
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms 
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party 
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the 
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree 
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments to be without merit. 
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 
886, 896 (Utah 1989} (court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal). 
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court 
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused 
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert 
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler, 
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter, 
v. Suoarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975) ; Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish 
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted); 
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a 
substantial hardship on the State"). 
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay in 
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to 
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases 
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense 
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988 
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment11 in value of property does not 
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles 
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Cir. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not 
(continued...) 
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced 
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, ve remand this case to the 
trial court. 
Nof^kn H. Jackson 
WE CONCUR: 
CKidith M. Billings, Judge^ 
ramela T\ GreenwoodP Judge 
1. (...continued) 
alone convert delay into laches) ; Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 
A. 2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does 
not in and of itself convert delay into laches) ; Lincoln v. 
Fisher, 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959). 
A change in property value is one factor courts should 
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves. 170 F.2d 
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d 
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 1976) . Further, other courts have determined that a change 
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change 
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a 
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985). 
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the 
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record 
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims 
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind 
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings 
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the 
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to 
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the.default judgment 
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest 
in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and 
any damages for breach of title warranties. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Anderson v. Poms, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 ("Anderson IP) 
984 P.2d 392 
372 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 1999 UT App 207 
(Cite as: 984 P.2d 392) 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Ellen ANDERSON, as personal representative of 
the Estate of D.C. Anderson; Dan 
Scott; Ellen Anderson, personally; and Jeanne 
Scott, Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross appellants, 
v. 
Eugene E. DOMS and Michael R. McCoy, 
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross appellee. 
No. 971762-CA. 
June 24, 1999. 
Vendors brought suit for foreclosure based on 
default on trust deed note given to secure balance 
owed on purchase price. Purchaser counterclaimed 
for rescission or damages for breach of implied 
covenants, breach of contract, fraud, and 
misrepresentation. Following bench trial, the 
District Court denied request for rescission based 
upon laches and awarded purchaser monetary 
damages as result of encumbrances on property. 
The Court of Appeals remanded for additional 
findings on laches. On remand, the District Court 
again held that laches barred rescission and 
awarded attorney fees and costs. Both sides 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that: (1) vendors did not suffer requisite 
prejudice to support laches bar to rescission claim; 
(2) rescission was appropriate remedy for vendors' 
breach of covenant; (3) there was no statutory or 
contractual basis to support award of fees and 
costs to purchaser; and (4) vendors were entitled to 
fees incurred in securing default judgment on 
foreclosure claim that was subsequently vacated. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error kl008.1(8.1) 
30kl008.1(8.1) 
Although the determination of whether a party was 
prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is 
a legal conclusion that is reviewed for correctness, 
trial court's findings of fact underlying that 
conclusion will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous. 
[2] Appeal and Error k842(l) 
30k842(l) 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
[3] Appeal and Error kl024.1 
30kl024.1 
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings 
supporting an award of attorney fees is reviewed 
under a correction-of-error standard. 
[4] Appeal and Error k757(3) 
30k757(3) 
Appellant was relieved of his burden to marshal 
evidence by reason of inadequacy of trial court's 
findings, which were unsupported in record or did 
not support ultimate conclusion on issue of laches. 
[5] Vendor and Purchaser kl 19 
400kll9 
Purchaser's failure to pay taxes on property and 
resulting tax sale did not prejudice vendors, so as 
to support laches bar based on purchaser's delay in 
seeking rescission of real estate contract, where tax 
sale was ultimately declared void and purchaser 
paid taxes and regained title to property. 
[6] Vendor and Purchaser kl 19 
400kll9 
Delay in seeking rescission of real estate contract 
did not prejudice vendors through loss of witnesses 
or evidence, so as to raise laches bar to rescission 
claim, despite death of one vendor in interim, 
absent proof that vendors were deprived, to their 
prejudice, of any specific evidence or testimony. 
[7] Vendor and Purchaser kl 19 
400kll9 
Loss in value of property did not by itself show 
that vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's delay 
in bringing rescission action, so as to raise laches 
bar to rescission claim. 
[8] Equity k72(4) 
150k72(4) 
Increase or decrease in the value of property alone 
does not satisfy the prejudice prong of the laches 
defense. 
[9] Vendor and Purchaser k 119 
400kll9 
Trial court's finding that it would be inequitable to 
allow purchaser to rescind contract because he 
would benefit from his poor decisions, was moral 
judgment, not fact finding, and did not support 
conclusion that vendors were prejudiced by 
purchaser's delay in seeking rescission of contract 
and that rescission was accordingly barred by 
laches. 
[ 10] Vendor and Purchaser k 119 
400kll9 
Purchaser's failure to make payments under trustee 
deed note did not show that vendors were 
prejudiced by purchaser's failure to perform, so as 
to impose laches bar based on purchaser's delay in 
bringing rescission action, where any prejudice was 
precipitated by vendors' breach of covenant against 
encumbrances. 
[11] Vendor and Purchaser kl 19 
400kll9 
Absent proof that vendors were prejudiced by 
purchaser's several year delay in bringing action to 
rescind real estate purchase contract, laches did not 
bar relief. 
[12] Vendor and Purchaser kl 10 
400kll0 
Rescission of contract was proper remedy for 
vendor's breach of covenant against encumbrances. 
[13] Vendor and Purchaser kl26 
400kl26 
Upon rescission of contract for vendor's breach of 
warranty in case in which purchaser made no 
significant improvements or changes to real 
property, purchaser was entitled to return of net 
payments made on trust deed note less rental value 
of property plus interest. 
[14]Costskl94.16 
102kl94.16 
Attorney fees are recoverable only if there is a 
statutory or contractual basis for awarding such 
fees. 
[15] Covenants kl32(2) 
108kl32(2) 
Purchaser who was successful in obtaining 
rescission of real estate contract based on breach of 
covenant against encumbrances was not entitled to 
award of fees, as there was no statute or 
contractual provision justifying award for 
rescission remedy and purchaser did not incur 
attorney fees in any attempt to remove 
encumbrances. 
[16] Mortgages k580 
266k580 
[16] Mortgages k581(3) 
266k581(3) 
Vendors were entitled to attorney fees and costs 
incurred in securing default judgment in 
foreclosure action against purchaser under trust 
deed note, but not to other fees incurred in 
litigation after default judgment was vacated, as 
purchaser ultimately prevailed. 
*394 Larry R. Keller, Keller & Lundgren Lc, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nessett, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent. Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., and 
BENCH and DAVIS. JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
U 1 Defendant Eugene E. Doms appeals for the 
second time the trial court's denial of his request to 
rescind a real estate contract. Plaintiffs Ellen 
Anderson and Dan and Jeanne Scott cross-appeal, 
arguing, among other things, that the doctrine of 
laches bars recission of the contract. [FN1] Both 
parties appeal the trial court's award of attorney 
fees and costs. We reverse and remand. 
FN1. Because the resolution of whether 
laches bars rescission in this case is 
dispositive, we do not address plaintiffs' 
alternative arguments. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 In March 1982, plaintiffs Dan and Jeanne 
Scott, Ellen Anderson, and D.C. Anderson, Ellen 
Anderson's now deceased husband, sold a parcel of 
property known as Rossi Hills (the property) in 
Park City, Utah, to Doms and Michael R. McCoy 
for residential development. In connection with 
this sale, plaintiffs executed a Warranty Deed that 
included a covenant against encumbrances. Doms 
and McCoy executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note to secure payment of the balance owed on the 
purchase price of $194,250. Doms and McCoy 
also acquired an interest in a parcel adjoining the 
property known as the "slipper parcel." McCoy no 
longer has any interest in the property and is not 
involved in this appeal. 
f 3 In late 1984 or early 1985, Doms's attorney 
informed him that several encroachments and 
easements existed on the property. [FN2] As a 
result, Doms did not make the scheduled payments 
on the property and attempted to deed the property 
back to plaintiffs in return for cancellation of the 
Trust Deed Note. Plaintiffs did not respond to this 
offer and, in June 1985, filed a complaint seeking 
to foreclose on the property. Two years later, 
plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against 
Doms and McCoy because they failed to file an 
answer in response to plaintiffs' complaint. Nine 
days after entry of the default judgment, Doms 
filed an answer and counterclaim to plaintiffs' 
complaint. Approximately four months later, the 
trial court entered an order setting aside the default 
judgment against Doms on the condition that Doms 
pay all attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs in 
obtaining the default judgment. However, the court 
reserved a final ruling on the award of these fees 
until final disposition of the case on the merits. 
FN2. Before purchasing the property, 
Doms was aware of the existence of 
several roads and sheds on the property. 
However, according to Doms, it was not 
until approximately two years after the 
purchase of the property that he learned of 
the legal significance of the encumbrances 
on the property. 
K 4 In May 1987, the property was sold to Summit 
County in a foreclosure sale for the nonpayment of 
property taxes. At that time, title to the property 
was held by Domcoy, a corporation formed by 
Doms and McCoy, to *395 which they had 
transferred their interest in the property. After 
Doms paid all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, 
and costs, Summit County conveyed the property 
to Domcoy by quitclaim deed. Domcoy then 
conveyed the property to Doms. [FN3] In the 
meantime, plaintiffs had filed another action 
challenging the tax sale and subsequent purchase of 
the property by Summit County, seeking to quiet 
title to the property in their favor. Upon 
stipulation of Summit County, plaintiffs, and 
Doms, the trial court set aside the tax sale. 
FN3. On remand, the trial court found that 
the conveyance of the property from 
Summit County to Doms after the tax sale 
resulted in Doms holding "clear title to the 
property." Therefore, plaintiffs' 
-3-
arguments premised on the contention that 
Doms did not hold title to the entire parcel 
are without merit 
1 5 In early 1988, Doms amended his 
counterclaim, seeking rescission of the contract or, 
in the alternative, damages for breach of implied 
covenants, breach of contract, fraud, and 
misrepresentation In 1990, the trial was 
bifurcated and a three day trial was held on the 
issue of rescission of the contract Plaintiffs 
argued, on the basis of laches, that Doms was 
prohibited from rescinding the contract because 
there was an unreasonable delay between the time 
Doms learned of the basis for rescission and his 
attempt to rescind the contract The trial court 
subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision, 
findmg that because Doms unreasonably delayed 
seeking rescission, laches barred rescission of the 
contract 
^6 The remainder of the trial focused on the issue 
of whether Doms was entitled to damages as a 
result of the encumbrances on the property The 
tnal court also held a hearing on the issue of 
attorney fees In its Second Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended 
Judgment, the tnal court, based upon laches, 
denied Doms's request for rescission and awarded 
Doms $83,000 in damages as a result of the 
encumbrances on the property and $101 50 in 
costs The tnal court also awarded $41,333 20 in 
attorney fees and costs, plus mterest, to plaintiffs 
T| 7 Both parties appealed the tnal court's decision 
on several grounds This court subsequently issued 
an unpublished Memorandum Decision holdmg 
that the tnal court improperly applied the doctnne 
of laches to bar rescission of the contract without 
first entering findings of fact regarding whether 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in 
seeking rescission See Anderson v Doms No 
920653-CA, slip op at 2-3 (Utah Ct App Nov 4, 
1994) (unpublished mem decision) 
Consequently, this court remanded the case to the 
tnal court for further findmgs on the issue of 
prejudice, stating, "If the tnal court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the [plaintiffs] 
were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine 
of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission " 
Id On remand, the tnal court agam refused to 
rescind the contract, concluding plaintiffs were 
prejudiced by Doms's delay m seeking rescission 
This appeal followed 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] f^ 8 Doms argues he is entitled to rescission 
because the tnal court's findings on remand do not 
support its conclusion that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced by his delay in seeking rescission of the 
contract See Borland v Chandler, 733 P 2d 144, 
147 (Utah 1987) ("To successfully assert a laches 
defense, a [party] must establish both that the 
[other party] unreasonably delayed in bnnging an 
action [to rescind the contract] and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay " (citmg 
Papamkolas Bros Enter v Sugarhouse Shopping 
Ctr Assocs , 535 P 2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975))) 
Although the determination of whether a party was 
prejudiced for purposes of the doctnne of laches is 
a legal conclusion that we review for correctness, 
we will not set aside a tnal court's findmgs of fact 
underlying that conclusion unless they are clearly 
erroneous See Sweeney Land Co v Kimball 
786 P 2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) 
[2] [3] T[ 9 Doms also challenges the tnal court's 
award of attorney fees and costs Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law 
which we review for correctness See Valcarce v 
Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998) (citmg 
Robertson v *396 Gem Ins , 828 P 2d 496, 499 
(Utah Ct App 1992)) The sufficiency of a tnal 
court's findings supporting an award of attorney 
fees is also reviewed under a correction-of-error 
standard See id Finally, although tnal courts are 
normally afforded broad discretion m determining 
what constitutes a reasonable fee, see id, such an 
award " 'must be based on the evidence and 
supported by findings of fact '" Salmon v Davis 
County, 916 P 2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) (quoting 
Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 830 P 2d 266, 268 
(Utah 1992)) 
ANALYSIS 
I Findmgs of Fact 
[4] Tj 10 In challenging the tnal court's findings of 
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fact, Doms argues he should be relieved of his 
burden to marshal the evidence because of the 
inadequacy of the tnal court's findings See 
Woodward v Fazzw, 823 P 2d 474. 477 (Utah 
Ct App 1991) ("There is, in effect, no need for an 
appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings 
are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully 
challenged as factual determinations ") We agree 
Because the findings Doms challenges are either 
unsupported in the record or do not support the 
conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced, we agree 
that Doms is, for the most part, relieved of the 
marshaling requirement We therefore address 
Doms's specific challenges to the tnal court's 
findings of fact 
A Finding 10a [FN4] 
FN4 Finding 10a states 
Doms had the use and benefit of the 
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs 
He purchased the slipper parcel and 
attempted to formulate a plan for a three-
parcel integrated development, but was 
unsuccessful The plaintiffs are now 
foreclosed from developing an mtegrated 
development because Doms has an mterest 
in the slipper parcel and the likelihood of 
Doms['s] cooperation with the plaintiffs in 
an integrated development is remote 
*f 11 Findmg 10a provides that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced because Doms has an mterest in the 
slipper parcel and would likely refuse to cooperate 
with plaintiffs in developing the adjoining property 
However, plaintiffs do not dispute that Doms's 
interest m the slipper parcel was extinguished at a 
tax sale Because this findmg is maccurate and 
without record support, it is clearly erroneous and 
has no relevance to the issue of prejudice 
B Finding 10b [FN5] 
FN5 Finding 10b states "Doms failed to 
pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 
1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, which 
resulted in a tax sale and required the 
plaintiffs to initiate legal action to clear the 
title" 
[5] f 12 Findmg 10b states that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced as a result of Doms's failure to pay 
taxes on the property However, we cannot see 
how failure to pay property taxes prejudiced 
plaintiffs Doms ultimately paid the taxes and 
regained title to the property Further, all parties 
stipulated that the tax sale was void and that 
plaintiffs' trust deed was a valid hen on the 
property Thus, finding 10b does not support the 
tnal court's conclusion that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced by Doms's delay 
C Findings 10c [FN6] and lOd [FN7] 
FN6 Finding of fact 10c states "D C 
Anderson, one of the principals in the 
transaction, died while Doms was in 
possession of the property, thus making it 
impossible to elicit testimony from the 
decedent" 
FN7 Finding of fact lOd states 
"Doms'[s] delay of more than six (6) years 
before he sought to rescind the transaction 
adversely affected the plaintiffs' 
opportunity to resolve the encroachment 
and easement problems because witnesses 
would be unavailable and memories are 
dimmed by the lapse of time " 
[6] If 13 Fmdmgs 10c and lOd both state that 
Doms's delay in seeking rescission resulted in the 
unavailability of witnesses Although it is true 
that one party to the original transaction, D C 
Anderson, had died and other witnesses may have 
become unavailable or forgotten information 
relevant to the sale of the property, these findings 
do not demonstrate that plaintiffs were depnved of 
any specific evidence or testimony or how lack of 
that evidence would adversely affect plaintiffs 
Because Findings 10c and lOd are conclusory and 
do not mclude any information *397 about 
testimony that plaintiffs could not elicit as a result 
of the delay, these findings do not support the tnal 
court's conclusion of prejudice 
T[ 14 Finding lOd also states that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced because Doms's delay prevented them 
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from resolving the encroachments on the property 
However, plaintiffs have not shown how Doms's 
delay made removing the encroachments any more 
difficult than it would have been before the sale of 
the property or in the event plaintiffs reacquire the 
property Thus, finding lOd does not show that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay 
D Findings lOe [FN8] and lOf [FN9] 
FN8 Finding of fact lOe states "During 
the time Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc 
and Summit County were in possession of 
the property, the property suffered a 50% 
reduction in its value " 
FN9 Finding of fact lOf states "Doms['s] 
inexperience in developing property or 
inability to sell the property impacted the 
plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in 
the real estate market and the increased 
costs to develop the property if they chose 
to do so" 
[7][8] % 15 Findings lOe and lOf state that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced because the property 
suffered a fifty percent decrease in value during the 
time that Doms possessed it The first time this 
case was appealed, we specifically rejected the 
argument that an increase or decrease in the value 
of property alone satisfies the prejudice prong of 
the laches defense See Child v Child, 8 Utah 2d 
261, 271, 332 P 2d 981, 988 (Utah 1958) (stating 
"natural increment" m value of property does not, 
standing alone, constitute prejudice for purposes of 
laches doctrine), see also West Los Angeles Inst 
for Cancer Research v Mayer, 366 F 2d 220,228 
(9th Cir 1966) (same) Rather, a change in 
property value is only one factor a court may 
consider in determining prejudice for the purpose 
of laches See Lawson v Haynes, 170 F 2d 741, 
744 (10th Cir 1948), Filler v Richland, 247 
Mont 285, 806 P 2d 537, 540 (1991), Jacobson 
v Jacobson, 557 P2d 156, 159 (Utah 1976) 
Therefore, the trial court's finding that the property 
suffered a decrease in value does not, in and of 
itself, show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms's delay 
E Finding lOg [FN 10] 
FN 10 Fmding of fact lOg states "Doms 
should not benefit from his poor decision 
at the expense of the plaintiffs To allow 
that to happen would be inequitable " 
[9] H 16 Finding lOg states that it would be 
inequitable to allow Doms to rescind the contract 
because he "should not benefit from his poor 
decisions " Because this statement appears to be 
nothing more than a moral judgment, unsupported 
by any evidence or law, we cannot say that it 
supports the tnal court's conclusion that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced 
F Finding lOh [FN11] 
FN11 Finding of fact lOh states "Doms 
was in default, therefore, he could not 
mvoke the doctrine of rescission " 
[10] *h 17 Finding lOh, actually a legal conclusion, 
states that Doms may not rescind the contract 
because he was in default We disagree 
Although Doms failed to make payments required 
by the Trust Deed Note, he was excused from 
doing so as a result of plaintiffs' breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances See Holbrook v 
Master Protection Corp, 883 P 2d 295,301 (Utah 
Ct App 1994) ("The law is well settled that a 
material breach by one party to a contract excuses 
further performance by the nonbreaching party ") 
(citmg Saunders v Sharp, 840 P 2d 796, 806 
(Utah Ct App 1992)), Wright v Westside 
Nursery, 787 P 2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct App 1990), 
Bergstrom v Moore, 677 P 2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 
1984) ("If it plainly appears that a seller has lost or 
encumbered his ownership so that he will not be 
able to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that a 
buyer continue to make payments") Any 
prejudice that resulted from Doms's failure to make 
payments pursuant to the Trust Deed Note was 
precipitated by plaintiffs' breach of warranty 
Because plaintiffs may not breach the contract and 
then claim they were prejudiced by Doms's failure 
to perform, this finding does not support the tnal 
court's conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced 
-6-
*398 [11] Tf 18 In our previous Memorandum 
Decision in this case, we stated that f,[i]f the trial 
court cannot find from the evidence presented that 
the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the 
equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission." Anderson v. Doms, No. 
920653-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct.App. Nov. 4, 
1994) (unpublished mem. decision). Having 
concluded the trial court1 s findings do not show that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced, we next address the 
remedy of rescission. 
II. Rescission 
[12] K 19 The only theory plaintiffs advance on 
appeal to bar rescission of the contract is laches. 
This theory fails, however, because plaintiffs have 
not shown any prejudice. Therefore, Doms is 
entitled to rescind the contract as a remedy for 
breach of warranty. Indeed, this remedy is 
consistent with Utah case law and that of other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bergs from v. Moore, 677 
P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) (granting rescission 
when seller breached covenant against 
encumbrances and stating, "mere knowledge of 
encumbrances... would not be sufficient to exclude 
them from the operation of the statutory covenant 
against encumbrances") (citing Jones v. Grow Inv. 
& Mortgage Co., 11 Utah 2d 326, 358 P.2d 909 
(1961)); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 
P.2d 716, 725 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (affirming 
rescission of contract where, although buyers were 
aware of encumbrance on property before 
purchase, they did not understand the legal 
implications of such encumbrance until five years 
after purchasing the property). 
[13] <f 20 On remand, the trial court should 
determine what is necessary to restore the parties to 
the status quo at the time the parties entered into 
the contract. See Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 
(affirming rescission of contract and placing 
parties in original positions by allowing recovery of 
payments already made under contract). In 
fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, 
the rule 
is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting 
the rights of the parties. How this is to be 
accomplished, or indeed whether it can. is a 
matter which is within the discretion of the trial 
court under the facts as found to exist by the trier 
of fact. The trial court therefore has discretion 
to fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy so 
that an aggrieved party is adequately 
compensated for its loss, so long as that remedy 
is not duplicative. 
Ong lnt'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (citation & emphasis 
omitted). 
1J 21 In this case, Doms apparently made no 
improvements or changes to the property such that 
the parties could not be returned to their respective 
positions prior to entering into the contract. We 
therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a 
determination and award to Doms of the net 
payments paid by him less rental value plus 
interest. [FN12] See Bergstrom, 611 P.2dat 1125. 
FN 12. Doms is entitled to a refund of 
monies paid as one of the original buyers 
of the property, and as the successor in 
interest to McCoy and Domcoy. 
III. Attorney Fees and Costs 
[14] [15] f 22 Both parties appeal from the trial 
court's award of attorney fees and costs. Attorney 
fees are recoverable only if there is a statutory or 
contractual basis for awarding such fees. See 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) 
(stating attorney fees will be awarded only when 
contract or statute provides basis for award). 
Although Doms requests fees for pursuing his 
rescission remedy, he cites no statute or contractual 
provision to justify such an award. Furthermore, 
because Doms has not incurred attorney fees to 
remove the encumbrances on the property, he is not 
entitled to fees and costs incurred in conjunction 
with breach of the covenant against encumbrances. 
See Forrer v. Sather, 595 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 
(Utah 1979) (holding party may recover attorney 
fees in connection with breach of covenant against 
encumbrance only "where the plaintiff purchased 
or extinguished the outstanding incumbrance" but 
not for "fee[s] in an action against the covenantor 
for breach of the covenant"). We *399 therefore 
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do not award any attorney fees to Doms. App 207 
[16] 123 Regarding the trial court's award of fees END OF DOCUMENT 
and costs to plaintiffs, we affirm the trial court's 
award of fees and costs incurred in obtaining the 
default judgment. See Dixonweb Printing Co. v. 
Photo Intercept Coupon Sys., 94 Civ. 
7436(MBM)(RLE), 1995WL384415,at*6, 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8871, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June27, 
1995) (affirming award of attorney fees and costs 
to plaintiffs in obtaining default judgment "whether 
or not defendant's conduct is willful"). However, 
because plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, we 
vacate all other awards to plaintiffs. See Loosle v. 
First Fed Sav. &LoanAss'n, 858P.2d999, 1003 
(Utah 1993) (denying request for attorney fees 
because no basis for award in connection with 
quiet title action where promissory note and trust 
deed provided only for attorney fees incurred in 
foreclosure). Thus, we remand to the trial court 
for consideration of plaintiffs' counsel's evidence 
regarding reasonable fees incurred in connection 
with obtaining the default judgment and an 
appropriate award based on that evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
1[ 24 The trial court's findings on remand did not 
adequately show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms's delay in seeking rescission of the contract. 
Furthermore, rescission of the contract in this case 
is consistent with Utah case law. Accordingly, the 
trial court should order rescission and determine an 
appropriate remedy in connection with rescinding 
the contract. We affirm the trial court's denial of 
attorney fees to Doms. We also affirm the trial 
court's fee award to plaintiffs incurred in 
connection with obtaining the default judgment but 
vacate all other attorney fee awards to plaintiffs. 
Both parties shall bear their respective attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
K 25 Reversed and remanded. 
H 26 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge 
1| 271 DISSENT: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 
984 P.2d 392, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 1999 UT 
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ADDENDUM C 
Denial of Petition for Rehearing in Anderson II 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
Utah Court o* Apo9als 
AUG '"• ; ;99 
juha D'Atesandru 
Clark of the Court 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. Anderson; Dan Scott; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; 
and Jeanne Scott, 
—II-.'-'. *-iffs, Appends and 
Cross-appellants, 
Euaene E. Poms and Michael R. 
McCoy, 
Defendants, Appellant and 
Cross-appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 971762-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellees'/cross-
appellants' petition for rehearing, filed July 22, 1999. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Further, the court wishes to clarify that in our June 24, 
1999, opinion rendered in this case, by reversing and remanding 
on the issue of rescission, this court necessarily vacated the 
trial court's prior award of damages based on breach of contrac: 
t e d t h i s \o Da 
FOR THE COURT: 
day of A u g u s t , 1 9 9 9 . 
€<H^ 
ADDENDUM D 
Modified Judgement and Minute Entry dated July 7,2001 
N o . _ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT J UI 1 0 2001 
InifdDJsinct Court IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UT^L 
Deputy Clerk, Sui^JTcS^ 
ELLEN ANDERSON, et al, 
Plaintiffs, MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, et al, Civil No. 850698339 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter is before the court for decision of numerous pending motions, all connected 
with this court's bench Ruling of June 29,2000. To the court's surprise and consternation, four 
Notices to Submit have been filed. The court cannot folly explain the course of events that has 
created this unprecedented (for this court) circumstance, but until receipt of Mr. Keller's June 26, 
2001, letter, on July 5,2001, the court was completely unaware of the last three Notices. 
As noted, the matter was argued and decided on June 29,2000. Thereafter, a proposed 
judgment was submitted and the file placed on the judge's desk. Mr. Biele then contacted the 
court and indicated that he would be traveling, and he requested a modest extension to file 
additional pleadings. Because the judge was about to leave the country for almost two weeks, 
Mr. Biele was advised that the matter would not be decided immediately in any event. The file 
was set aside in the judge's Coalville office. Over the next couple of months, numerous 
additional pleadings were filed, but the judge never saw another Notice to Submit, and in time 
the case was overlooked in the press of other matters. The judge should have realized the case 
was languishing, but he did not, and the court now offers its sincere apologies to all parties and 
both counsel for the unconscionable delay. 
For ease of reference only, the court will refer to the parties as Anderson and Doms. The 
matters before the court are numerous, but related. Doms' proposed Judgment was resubmitted 
in a modified form to address Anderson's Objection to certain interest calculations. The court 
finds the Objection was correct in principle, and the modification resolved the problem. 
Accordingly, the court has this date signed the Modified Judgment as proposed, except that the 
court has deleted paragraph 7 for the reasons stated below. 
Doms has also moved, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend that 
portion of the judgment that denies repayment of Doms' interest payment on the loan from 
plaintiffs. For the reasons stated at the hearing, and generally in accord with the "dual capacity" 
reasoning articulated in Anderson's opposition to the Motion, the court denies the Motion and 
affirms its prior decision, which is now set forth in the signed Modified Judgment. 
Anderson has filed several motions which all, in essence, ask the court to change its 
ruling. They include a Motion to Correct, Modify, or Reconsider, a Motion to Expand or 
Broaden the Proposed Judgment, and a "Corrected" Motion to Expand, etc. They are all either 
motions to amend or reconsider. A centerpiece of all is the continued assertion that there is no 
basis to find that Doms is successor-in-interest to McCoy and DomCoy. A second part of each 
Motion is a request that the court reconsider its imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, in the form of ar 
award of $500 attorney's fees. 
The court shares Doms' counsel's inability to understand why Mr. Biele continues to 
urge a position that seems so completely at odds with the law of the case so bluntly stated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, but ironically, his continued assertions cause this court to question its 
basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Biele seems to sincerely believe that (1) there is no 
factual basis for the successor-in-interest conclusion and, (2) even if that is the law of the case, 
the charge to this court is to restore Doms to his position before the events underlying this case 
occurred, and that position does not include any consideration of the position of the parties to 
whose interests he succeeded. While this court does not believe it has any such latitude, and that 
Doms is now, for all intents and purposes, McCoy and DomCoy, the court cannot find the 
repeated and unavailing argument was urged maliciously or in bad faith. Accordingly, the Rule 
11 finding is vacated. 
The court specifically instructs Mr. Biele, however, that he is not to raise the successor-
in-interest argument at the trial court level again, unless he has successfully argued the matter on 
some subsequent appeal and the terms of remand specifically permit such argument. Any 
violation of this instruction shall result in the imposition of sanctions in an amount to be 
determined. 
Except for the Rule 11 issue, Anderson's several Motions are without merit, and are 
DENIED. The Modified Judgment is the entered this date. This signed Minute Entry shall be 
the Order of the court, and no further Order is required unless counsel for Doms feels he needs 
some additional formal order to ensure finality of at least this stage of the proceedings, in which 
case he may submit an Order consistent with this Minute Entry. 
DATED this 7th day of July, 2001. 
By the Court: 
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ADDENDUM E 
Records of Summit County 








Founders Title Company 
875 Ironhorse #F 
P.O. Box 680845 
Park Citv, Utah 84068-0845 
Phone (435) 649-1945 
From Salt Lake (801) 531-9606 
Fax(435)649-i956 
May 25. 2000 
Mr. Irving H. Biehle 
Re: Park City Property, Summit County, Utah 
Dear Mr Biehle: 
As you have requested, we have conducted a title search of the tax records of Summit 
County, Utah and have determined that pursuant to the tax rolls., the following information is True 
and accurate: 
Eugene E, Doms, as to an undivided one-half ownership; and Ellen Anderson, Personal 
Representative for the Estate of DC Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally and Jeanne 
Scott as to an undivided one-eight interest each, in and tc the following described property: 
ALL OF LOTS 17. 18, 19, 20. 21, 22,23, 24, 25, 26. 27,2ty 29, 30, 31 AND 32. Block 58. 
Park City Survey, 
ALL OF LOTS 17,18 and 19. Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder 
Subject to matters of public record, not disclosed herein, but of record with the Summit 
County Recorder's Office. 
Respectfiijly^ours, ^ 
/ f e s F. Englap<!K 
LFE/mc 
Salt Like City Office 
1100 East 6600 South, Suite HO 
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Phone (801) 261-5503 
Fax (SOD 262-2741 
Dazn$ Office 
1133 N*orth Man 
Uyton, Utah 84041 
Phone 1*801 546-0606 
Fax (501) 546-0633 
Yfosalch Office 
P.O. Box 188 • 45 South Main Street 
Heber City, Utah 84032-013S 
Phone (435} 654-4322 • (435) 654-4353 
fax (435) 654-2045 
